Online, rate limited
A login form that slows down or locks after a few tries.
Waiting
Type to place this marker.
10 guesses per second. Many real sites allow fewer than this.
Checked on your device. Never sent anywhere.
Watch one secret against four attacker speeds: a login that slows down, a fast hash on one GPU, that same hash on a GPU cluster, and a slow hash such as bcrypt. The marker runs from instantly to longer than the universe. The password strength checker scores a single guess rate. This page is the comparison.
Shown as dots. Show reveals it on this screen only. It is not saved, not put in the address bar, and not included when you copy the share line.
The four timelines update as you type. Nothing is saved.
A login form that slows down or locks after a few tries.
Waiting
Type to place this marker.
10 guesses per second. Many real sites allow fewer than this.
A stolen fast hash, such as MD5 or NTLM, on one high-end GPU.
Waiting
Type to place this marker.
100 billion guesses per second. A labeled assumption for a fast hash, not a benchmark of a named card.
The same fast hash on about a thousand of those GPUs.
Waiting
Type to place this marker.
100 trillion guesses per second. About a thousand times the single-GPU rate.
A slow hash such as bcrypt at a high cost, on one strong GPU.
Waiting
Type to place this marker.
10,000 guesses per second. A labeled assumption for bcrypt at a high cost. Argon2 can be slower. A fast hash is not this row.
Times are an average: a lucky early guess can land sooner. This is a teaching sketch, not a promise about a real site.
Generated example. Not what you typed. Each card is a fresh string from this browser, then a longer string, a word, or a symbol.
…
One GPU: …
Bcrypt: …
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One GPU: …
Bcrypt: …
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One GPU: …
Bcrypt: …
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One GPU: …
Bcrypt: …
Words come from a bundled list of 512. The picker is
crypto.getRandomValues, the browser's cryptographic random source. The
phrase is not stored.
Length moves the marker more than a clever swap. A letter turned into a lookalike digit is a small list, not a new alphabet. If you do not know how a site stores the secret, believe the fast-hash rows. A slow hash such as bcrypt or Argon2 changes the offline math, and you usually do not pick that hash.
A lockout can stop a short password on a live login. A stolen database does not wait. One password per account matters more than a decoration on the end. The Password Habit Quiz scores reuse, a manager, and a second factor, and it never asks you to type a password. The password strength checker is the single-password score, still only on this device.
This passphrase list has 512 words, so four words are about 36 bits and can fall quickly to a fast hash. Six is a start on this page. A longer public list, such as a 7,776-word diceware list, gives more per word. Do not reuse a phrase that showed up in an article.
A long time here is not a safe account. It cannot see a reused password, a fake login page, or a stolen session. Open the real site from a bookmark you already trust.
No. The estimate runs in this browser. What you type is not sent, stored, or put in the share line. The page does not check a breach list or call an API with the field. If you accept cookies, site analytics can load, and that request does not include the field.
They are different speeds, written next to each row. A rate-limited login is 10 guesses per second. One GPU on a fast hash is 100 billion per second. A GPU cluster is 100 trillion per second. Bcrypt at a high cost is 10,000 per second. These are labeled assumptions, not a measurement of your accounts.
A character-pool count treats every character as random. Attackers try cheaper models first: a common guess, leetspeak, a keyboard walk, repeats, a sequence, a date, a name plus digits, or words from a list. The shortest honest model sets the times. The note names the model. It does not repeat what you typed.
No. This is a math sketch of guessing. It cannot see a reused password, a fake login page, a stolen session, or the hash a real site chose. The password habit quiz covers reuse, a manager, and a second factor, and it never asks you to type a password.
It uses the browser crypto.getRandomValues source and a bundled list of
512 words. Six words from that list is about 54 bits. A longer public list, such as a
7,776-word diceware list, gives more entropy per word. The phrase is not stored.
The strength checker scores one password and a single crack-time guess. This page is the attacker view: the same kind of secret under four speeds, with the assumptions written on each row. Both stay on your device.